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Chess-like games are dominance solvable in at most two steps
Abstract
We show that strictly competitive, finite games of perfect information that may end in one of three
possible ways can be solved by applying only two rounds of elimination of dominated strategies.
Chess-like Games are Dominance Solvable in at Most Two Steps
by Christian Ewerhart¤
July 2000
Abstract: We show that strictly competitive, …nite games of perfect information
that may end in one of three possible ways can be solved by applying only two
rounds of elimination of dominated strategies.
¤ University of Mannheim and Deutsche Börse Group. E-mail: christian.ewerhart@planet-
interkom.de. I wish to thank Ehud Kalai, Susan Ne¤, and the anonymous editor in charge for
useful suggestions on the paper. For helpful discussions, I am grateful to seminar participants
in Turin, especially to Dieter Balkenborg.
1. Introduction
In probably the …rst contribution to pure game theory at all, Zermelo (1913)
proved that the game of chess has a value, i.e. that either there is a winning
strategy for White, or there is a winning strategy for Black, or both players can
secure themselves a draw. Since then, a rich theory has developed for general
games of perfect information,1 yet surprisingly little is implied by this theory for
speci…c games as chess. E.g., the question which of the three possible values of
chess obtains remains unsettled almost 90 years after Zermelo’s original derivation.
In this paper we show that chess-like games, i.e., strictly competitive, …nite
games of perfect information with at most three outcomes can be solved by apply-
ing only two rounds of elimination of dominated strategies in the strategic form.
In plain words, our result says that these games (one of which is chess) have
the following property. Consider the strategic form of the game. Eliminate all
dominated strategies from the strategy sets of each player. Repeat this procedure
once. Then the remaining strategy pro…les all induce the same outcome, which
corresponds to the value of the game.
An analogous result for games with at most two outcomes is easily established:
Fix any strictly competitive, …nite games of perfect information with at most two
outcomes.2 Then, by Zermelo’s theorem, one of the players, say player i, has a
winning strategy. Clearly, this strategy dominates all of player i’s non-winning
strategies, so that a single round of elimination reduces the strategy set of player
i to the set of winning strategies. Thus, any strictly competitive, …nite game of
perfect information with at most two outcomes is dominance solvable in (at most)
one step.
2. Notation and De…nitions
We consider any …nite, strictly competitive game G of perfect information with
at most three outcomes.3 Formally, let
G = (X;x0; ®; ¶; !);
2
where X is a …nite set of nodes, x0 2 X is the initial node, ® : Xnfx0g ! X
is the anterior node function, and if Z = Xn®(X) denotes the set of terminal
nodes,4 then ¶ : XnZ ! f1; 2g denotes the player function, and ! = (!1; !2) :
Z ! f(1;¡1); (0; 0); (¡1; 1)g the outcome function. For a given pair of nodes
x; x0 we say that x0 precedes x when there is an H ¸ 0 and a sequence x0 =
x0; x1; :::; ; xH = x such that ®(xh) = xh¡1 for h = 1; :::;H. Let X(x) denote the
set of nodes preceded by x. Note that by de…nition, x is contained in X(x). We
require that x0 precedes any x 2 X. Let x1 be any node. The subgame rooted in
x1 is de…ned by
G(x1) := (X(x1); x1; ®1; ¶jX(x1)nZ1 ; !jZ1),
where ®1 := ®jX(x1)nZ1, and Z1 := X(x1)n®1(X(x1)).5 For any non-terminal node
x 2 XnZ, let Ax := fy 2 Xj®(y) = xg be the set of actions available at node x:
By an action pro…le we mean a tuple s = (ax)x2XnZ , where ax 2 Ax. The terminal
node z(s) 2 Z determined by s is characterized by the property that there exists
a sequence x0 = x0; x1; :::; xH = z(s) such that axh¤¡1 = xh for h = 1; :::; H.
Call (x0; x1; :::; xH) the path p(s) leading to z(s): If, for a given node x, and an
action pro…le s, we have x = xh for some index h 2 f0; :::; Hg, then we will say
that s reaches G(x) (or simply x). A …nite two-person game in normal form is a
quadruple
N = (S1; S2; u1(:); u2(:));
where Si is player i’s (…nite) strategy set and ui : S1£ S2 ! < is player i’s utility
function. The strategic form of the perfect information game G is the normal-form
game N(G) := (S1; S2; u1(:); u2(:)), with strategy sets
Si :=
Y
x2XnZ
¶(x)=i
Ax;
and utility functions given by ui(s) := !i(z(s1; s2)), for i = 1; 2.6 A strategy
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si is dominated by another strategy s0i, if ui(si; sj) · ui(s0i; sj) for all sj and
there exists an s0j such that ui(si; s
0
j) < ui(s
0
i; s
0
j).
7 Strategy si is said to be dom-
inated (without quali…cation) if it is dominated by some other strategy.8 Let
N = (S1; S2; u1(:); u2(:)) be a …nite two-person game in normal form. Then the
game resulting from N by elimination of dominated strategies is de…ned as
D(N) := ( eS1; eS2; u1jeS1£eS2(:); u2jeS1£eS2(:)),
where eSi is the set of strategies for player i that are not dominated in N . Let
D1(N) := D(N) and Dk(N) := D(Dk¡1(N)) for k > 1. We will say that Dk(N)
results from k-fold elimination of dominated strategies. A normal-form game N
is called dominance solvable9 in at most k steps if the utility functions in Dk(N)
are constant. Note that if N is dominance solvable in at most k steps then, for
any K ¸ k, Dk(N) = DK(N) and N is dominance solvable in at most K steps.
The value of a normal-form game N for player i is
vi(N) := max
si2Si
min
sj2Sj
ui(si; sj).
For a node x in a perfect information game G, we will write vi(x) := vi(N(G(x)))
for the value of the subgame rooted in x to player i. A strategy si 2 Si is a
maximin strategy if si 2 argmaxesi2Si minsj2Sj ui(esi; sj). We denote the set of
maximin strategies for player i in N byMi(N). For future reference, we state the
famous:
Proposition 1. (Minmax Theorem) Let N be the strategic form of a …nite
perfect-information game of con‡icting interests. Then v1(N) = ¡v2(N).
Proof: See Binmore (1992, p. 44):
3. The Result
Theorem 1. Let N = N(G) be the strategic form of a …nite, strictly competitive
game of perfect information with at most three outcomes. Then N is dominance
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solvable in at most two steps.
Proof: By the Minmax Theorem, either one of the players has a winning
strategy10 (case A), or each of them can enforce a draw (case B).
Case A:Without loss of generality, assume that player 1 has a winning strategy,
i.e., v1(N) = 1. Then, by de…nition, a strategy s1 is a maximin strategy for player
1 if and only if
u1(s1; :) ´ 1. (1)
Therefore, a strategy of player 1 is dominated (by s1) if and only if it is not a
maximin strategy. Consequently, player 1’s strategy set in D(N) isM1(N). From
(1) we see that the utility functions for both players are constant in D(N) and
hence thatN is dominance solvable in (at most) one step. This proves the theorem
for vi(N) = §1:
Case B: Let now v1(N) = v2(N) = 0: Assume that u1(s1; s2) = ¡1 for some
strategy pro…le (s1; s2), where both s1 and s2 are undominated in N . To prove the
theorem, it su¢ces to show that s1 is dominated in D(N). By assumption, N =
N(G) for some …nite game G of perfect information. Consider the path p(s) =
(x0; x1; :::; xH) associated with the action pro…le s = (s1; s2). By assumption,
v1(x0) = 0 and v1(xH) = ¡1. Let xh¤ be the …rst node (i.e., with lowest index)
on the path p(s) with non-zero value of the subgame rooted in xh¤
We will show that v1(xh¤) = ¡1. This is clear if h¤ = H. Let therefore
h¤ < H. To provoke a contradiction assume that v1(xh¤) = 1. Consider the
alternative strategy es1 2 S1 which is equal to s1 at all nodes x 2 XnX(xh¤), i.e.,
outside of the subgame rooted in xh¤, and which is equal to some winning strategy
in G(xh¤). We show that es1 dominates s1 in N . Clearly, u1(es1; es2) ¸ u1(s1; es2)
for all es2 2 S2 (this holds obviously for all es2 such that (s1; es2) reaches xh¤, and
with equality for all es2 such that (s1; es2) does not reach xh¤). Moreover, as (es1; s2)
reaches xh¤ ,
u1(es1; s2) = 1 > ¡1 = u1(s1; s2);
so that s1 is dominated by es1 in N , thereby contradicting the assumption that s1
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is a strategy in D(N).
We have shown that v1(xh¤) = ¡1, and we know from the de…nition of h¤ that
v1(xh¤¡1) = 0. Hence, by the Minmax Theorem, player 2 has a winning strategy
in the subgame rooted in xh¤, yet no winning strategy in the subgame rooted in
xh¤¡1. Consequently, at node xh¤¡1, it must be player 1’s turn.
We are still on our way to prove that s1 is dominated in the reduced game
D(N). Consider the alternative strategy s01 2 S1 that is equal to s1 outside of
the subgame G(xh¤¡1), and that is equal to some maximin strategy (guaranteeing
player 1 a utility of 0) in G(xh¤¡1). We will show that s01 dominates s1 in D(N).
We prove …rst that s01 is at least as good as s1 against any strategy s
0
2 available
in D(N) for player 2. Assume to the contrary that there is some strategy s02 in
D(N) such that
u1(s
0
1; s
0
2) < u1(s1; s
0
2). (2)
Then the node xh¤¡1 is reached by both the pro…les (s01; s
0
2) and (s1; s
0
2). (If none
of the two pro…les reached the subgame G(xh¤¡1), then utility levels could not
di¤er. Moreover, since s1 and s01 are equal outside of G(xh¤¡1), one pro…le reaches
the subgame if and only if the other does so.) Thus, as s01 induces a maximin
strategy in G(xh¤¡1), and as v1(xh¤¡1) = 0, we get u1(s01; s
0
2) ¸ 0. From (2), it
follows that u1(s1; s02) = 1.
Now, the pro…le (s1; s02) reaches even the node xh¤. (The pro…le (s1; s
0
2) reaches
xh¤¡1, and at the node xh¤¡1 player 1 is called to play, as was shown further above.)
We show that in this case, s02 is dominated in N . Consider the alternative strategy
s002 2 S2 which is equal to s02 outside of the subgame G(xh¤) and is equal to some
winning strategy in G(xh¤). (Recall that v2(xh¤) = 1:) The strategy s002 is at least
as good as s02 for all possible strategies for player 1 (by an argument similar to
the one used above to show that es1 dominates s1), and strictly better against s1
since
u2(s1; s
0
2) = ¡u1(s1; s02) = ¡1 < 1 = u1(s1; s002).
(Note that (s1; s002) reaches G(xh¤), since (s1; s
00
2) is equal to (s1; s2) outside of the
subgame G(xh¤).) Hence, s02 is dominated in N , and therefore there does not exist
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a strategy s02 in D(N) satisfying (2).
We show now that s01 is sometimes strictly better than s1 in D(N): This is
the case when player 2 chooses s2. To see this note …rst that (s01; s2) reaches
the subgame G(xh¤¡1). (This is so because (s01; s2) is equal to (s1; s2) outside of
G(xh¤), hence a fortiori outside of G(xh¤¡1):) Hence, as v1(xh¤¡1) = 0,
u1(s
0
1; s2) ¸ 0 > ¡1 = u1(s1; s2).
In sum, this shows that s1 is dominated in D(N) by s01, and concludes the analysis
of case B, so that the theorem is proved.
The proof makes extensive use of the perfect information assumption. Once
this assumption is dropped, the result ceases to hold. To see this, consider the
normal-form game N1 depicted in Figure 1. This game satis…es all assumptions of
Theorem 1 except that it is of imperfect information. And, there is no dominated
strategy in N1.
– insert Figure 1 here –
4. Conclusion
We have shown that chess-like games can be solved by applying only two rounds
of elimination of dominated strategies.11
Our result raises the following, as we …nd, puzzling issue. The standard way
for determining the value of a …nite zero-sum game of perfect information is by
backward reasoning – beginning with the decisions to be made at the end of
the game, and ending with the decisions to be made at the beginning of the
game. In terms of rationality, this seems to require that players hold mutual
beliefs (or knowledge) of rationality (in the sense that “White believes that Black
believes that White believes and so on”) of a degree equal to the (potentially huge!)
maximal number of moves of the game.12 In contrast, when players determine the
value of the extensive-form game by iterated dominance in the strategic form,
then the necessary level of mutual beliefs of rationality seems to be only two!13
7
We conjecture that the following more general statement is true: Any strictly
competitive, …nite game of perfect information with n outcomes can be solved by
applying n¡ 1 rounds of elimination of dominated strategies.14
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Footnotes
1) While von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) developed the notion of an
extensive-form game …rst, the by now standard formulation of extensive-form
(and in particular, of perfect-information) games was given by Kuhn (1953). For
an introduction to the theory of games of perfect information, see Osborne and
Rubinstein (1994, chapter II) and references given there.
2) These are games that cannot end in a draw. Examples include Nim, Hex
and other simple games played for diversion (cf. Binmore, 1992).
3) All games will be understood to be without chance moves.
4) We follow standard notation when applying functions to sets. E.g., ®(X) :=
f®(x)jx 2 Xg.
5) As usual, for a mapping f , the restriction of f to a subset Y of its domain
is denoted by f jY .
6) The strategic form is non-reduced in the sense that it may contain equivalent
strategies, i.e., strategies si and s0i such that u1(si; :) ´ u1(s0i; :) and u2(si; :) ´
u2(s
0
i; :):
7) As usual, j 2 f1; 2g, and j 6= i: Note that we abuse notation by changing
the order of the arguments of the utility functions when i = 2.
8) For a discussion of the form of dominance used here, see Börgers (1993).
9) The notion of a “dominance solvable” game was introduced by Moulin
(1979). See also Moulin (1986).
10) By a winning strategy in G, we mean a maximin strategy in N(G) guar-
anteeing a utility of 1 for the player in question.
11) In terms of computational complexity, it should make a serious di¤erence
whether a game is analyzed one way or the other. In the traditional backwards
induction procedure, every node is visited once, and in the elimination procedure,
every pair of strategies must be checked for dominance, twice, and for both players.
12) Aumann (1995) writes that backwards induction presupposes “that all
players know that all are rational, all know this, all know this, and so on [...] at
least, for a number of levels no less than the maximum duration of the game”.
10
Balkenborg and Winter (1997) formalize and prove this result for generic perfect
information games.
13) This observation may be related to well-known puzzles associated with the
iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies. Cf., e.g., Samuelson (1992),
Börgers and Samuelson (1992), Ewerhart (1998), and the discussion in Gul (1996).
14) In fact, any such game is dominance solvable (see Moulin, 1979, Prop. 2,
and Gretlein, 1982). However, the existing proof is based on a backward induction
argument, and therefore the resulting bound for the number of iterations is not
lower than the maximal number of moves in the game.
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